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In California, as in most states, employment at-will is on its way
out. This is true despite Labor Code Section 29221 and despite the
California Supreme Court's holding in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.2
It is on its way out for the same reason that other legal rules wither
and disappear: it is increasingly incongruous with the legal and social
fabric of which it is a part.3
The basic premise of the at-will rule-that workers have no rights
except those they are able to extract through individual negotiation
and agreement 4 -is inconsistent with the regime of collective bargaining5
and with the pattern of legal regulation of the workplace that has
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; former
Associate Justice, California Supreme Court.
I. California Labor Code section 2922 provides: "An employment, having no specified
term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a
specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month." CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 2922 (West 1989).
2. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). The Foley court held, among
other things, that tort damages are not available for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in an employment contract.
3. For a modern theoretical discussion of this type of incongruity, see M. EISENBERG,
Tim NATURE OF m CoMMoN LAW 104-45 (1988).
4. In Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), the court put it this way:
The sufficient and conclusive answer to the many plausible arguments to the contrary,
portraying the evil to workmen and to others from the exercise of such authority
by the great and strong, is: They have the right to discharge their employe[e]s. The
law cannot compel them to employ workmen, nor to keep them employed. If they
break contracts with workmen they are answerable only to them; if in the act of
discharging them, they break no contract, then no one can sue for loss suffered
thereby. Trade is free; so is employment. The law leaves employer and employe[e]
to make their own contracts; and these, when made, it will enforce; beyond this it
does not go.
Id. at 520.
5. Under the typical collective bargaining agreement, employees may be dismissed only
for just cause, subject to review by a neutral arbitrator. See F. ELxomu & E. ELcoURI, How
ARBrrRATION WORKS 652-53, 664-67 (4th ed. 1985). For discussion of the impact of the
collective bargaining regime on mobility of labor, see S. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCiACY:
MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND m TRANSFORMATION oF WoRx IN AmERICAN INDusTRY 1900-1945,
at 275-80 (1985).
[1351
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emerged over the last quarter century. 6 Moreover, the recent decline7
in union organization has created a vacuum that provides additional
impetus for legal change. The rule itself has become so riddled with
statutory and judicially-created exceptions that it can scarcely stand.'
The at-will rule is also out of step with job protection systems
adopted by other industrialized nations and with international norms.
All of our European competitors, as well as our Canadian neighbors,
have statutes that protect employees against wrongful discharge and
establish tribunals in which such claims can be adjudicated. 9 A con-
6. Of course, earlier regulation of the work place existed: state wage and hour laws,
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance laws, worker safety laws, and the federal
wage and hour law of 1935. The modern flowering of regulation, however, began with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1864, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)), and has continued with numerous other federal
statutes, including: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No.
90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)); the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988)); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988)); the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988)); the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988)); and the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-112, 103 Stat 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
7. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, the unionized share of the private sector work
force declined from about 400 to about 15076. See Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The
Wagner Act at Fifty, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3-12 (1986); see also Korn, Collective Rights
and Individual Remedies: Rebalancing the Balance After Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic
Chef, Inc., 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1174-78 (1990) (discussing the statistics and causal factors
regarding declining unionization).
8. Statutory exceptions to the at-will rule are found in the multiple federal and state
laws that prohibit discrimination against employees for particular reasons. See 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (1988) (union membership or activity); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) (age); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988) (race, sex, religion, national ancestry, or origin); CAL. GOv'T CODE
§ 12940 (West Supp. 1990) (handicap and marital status); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1989)
(political activities); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1102-1105 (West 1989) (whistleblowing) CAL. LAB.
CODE § 6399.7 (West 1989) (refusal to work under unsafe conditions).
The courts also have recognized numerous judicial exceptions to the at-will rule. See Mauk,
Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 201,
226-45 (1985); St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full
Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 59-61 (1988).
9. See Hepple, Security of Employment, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 355 (R. Blanpain 3d ed. 1987); see also INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (R. Blanpain ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO-
PEDIA] (country-by-country monographs); L. DICKENS, M. JONES, B. WEEKES & M. HART,
DISMISSED (1985) (discussing the British system); Bellace, Employment Protection in the EEC,
20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 413 (1984) (discussing German and British statutes); Estreicher, Unjust
Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 310, 311-18 (1985) (raising the
possibility of transplanting Canadian and Western European statutes); Simmons, Unjust
[Vol. 42
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vention of the International Labour Organization of the United Nations
(ILO) calls upon all signatory countries to adopt such a statute; 10 the
United States, however, is the only country in the world whose official
representative voted against that convention." The United States stands
isolated within the international community.
At-will employment increasingly clashes with real life expectations
in the work place. Tell modern workers that they can be fired for any
reason or none at all, and they are likely to be surprised.' 2 Indeed,
employers may be surprised as well since the modern corporate man-
ager understands that fair treatment of workers yields productivity and
most likely has implemented systems of performance evaluation, pro-
gressive discipline, and internal grievance machinery. 3 The company
Dismissal of the Unorganized Workers in Canada, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 473, 475-76 (1984)
(discussing the Canadian system); Weiss, Individual Employment Rights: Focusing on Job
Security in the Federal Republic of Germany, 67 NEB. L. REv. 82, 82-83 (1988) (examining
employment rights in West Germany).
10. Convention No. 158: Termination of Employment, 65 ILO Official Bulletin Series A,
No. 2, 72 (1982) (concerning termination at the initiative of the employer). The Convention
calls on signatory countries to require a "valid reason" for terminating covered employees
(Article Four), to prohibit discriminatory firings (Article Five), and to provide an appeal
procedure before an impartial body (Article Eight).
The Convention leaves signatory countries flexibility in choosing the means of implementing
these standards. Article One urges member countries to enact legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the Convention's proposal "in so far as they are not otherwise made effective
by means of collective agreements, arbitration awards or court decisions or in such other
manner as may be consistent with national practice."
11. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 MICH. J. L.
REFoRM 207, 210 (1983). The United States has ratified only nine out of more than 160 ILO
conventions, and all but one of those ratified involved maritime standards. In 1988, the United
States ratified Convention Number 144, which called for tripartite consultations among the
government, workers, and employers on ILO-related issues, including reviewing possible
ratification of other ILO conventions. Linsenmayer, U.S. Ends ILO Moratorium by Ratifying
Two Conventions, MoNrmy LAB. Ray., June 1988, at 52.
12. A survey conducted in Nebraska found that the overwhelming majority of people
polled did not know that in the absence of a contract, employers can terminate employees
without giving a reason. Forbes & Jones, A Comparative, Attitudinal, and Analytical Study
of Dismissal of At-Will Employees Without Cause, 37 LAB. L.J. 157, 165 (1986). My students,
who comprise the staff at a Workers' Rights clinic in San Francisco, confirm this data: workers
they interview are almost uniformly under the impression that the law protects them against
arbitrary discharges. This impression is not surprising, given the modem prevalence of long-
term employment. See Carey, Occupational Tenure in 1987, MONTMY LAB. REV., Oct. 1988,
at 12; Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AM. ECON. Ray. 716,
719-21 (1982).
13. In a survey of 222 companies including manufacturing and nonmanufacturing business
as well as nonbusiness enterprises, the overwhelming majority maintained a system of pro-
gressive discipline (94% of union work forces, 93% of nonunion work forces). Employee
Discipline and Discharge, BNA PERSONNEL PoLIciEs F. Stray. No. 139 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter
PERSONNEL PoLIcIEs SuIvEY]; see also D. EwniG, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVI14G GRIavANcES
im Tm NONUNION WORKPLACE (1989) (discussing various employer-instituted models of due
November 1990]
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lawyer may advise adoption of express at-will provisions in employ-
ment documents as a prophylactic measure,' 4 but against this back-
ground even an employer would find such provisions artificial, if not
hypocritical. 5
Most significantly, employment at-will has become incongruous
with our social norms, with our views of who we are as a polity, and
with the kind of society in which we want to live. To put the matter
bluntly, employment at-will should be given notice and dismissed.' 6
That is not likely to occur, however, without legislative action.' 7
California appears to be the only state that statutorily enshrines the
employment at-will principle as a presumption. 8 Although this stat-
utory provision is part of the 1872 codification of the California com-
process); Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986
Wis. L. REV. 733, 743-50 (discussing the implications of such procedures for the law).
14. The efficacy of at-will disclaimers, which are provisions in employment documents
designed to preserve at-will status, has been the subject of a number of lawsuits and of much
academic discussion. See Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1217, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 185 (1989); McClain v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 256 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1989); Bratton v. Menard, 438 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); M. McC.AIN, EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION LAW: A PRACTICAL GUImE FOR EMPLOYERS 45-47 (rev. 1989); Witt & Goldman,
Avoiding Liability in Employee Handbooks, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 5 (1988).
15. The BNA Personnel Policies Forum Survey found that 71% of the participating firms
had taken steps to protect against wrongful termination liability in the two years preceding
the survey. Of these, 53% had added at-will language to applications and handbooks; 49%
had removed language suggesting limits on management's right to terminate. Id. at 27. See
PERSONNEL POLICIES SURVEY, supra note 13, at 27.
16. My thoughts on this subject are by no means original. More than 20 years ago
Professor Laurence E. Blades published a critique of the at-will rule in which he advocated
modification through judicial creativity. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 1404 (1967). Since
then the volume of scholarly literature on the subject has been replete with articles critical of
the at-will principle and advocating judicial or legislative modification. See Mauk, supra note
8; Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481 [hereinafter Summers, Individual Protection] (1976); Summers, Individual Rights in
the Workplace: The Employment-at-Will Issue: Introduction, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201
(1983); Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HnAv. L. REV. 1816 (1980). Not all of the literature, however, has
been critical of the rule. See Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV.
947 (1984) (support for the at-will rule based on economic efficiency); Harrison, The "New"
Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA
L. REV. 327 (1984) (same). But see Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case
for Arbitration, 13 EMPL. REL. L.J. 404, 420-21 (1987-1988) (criticizing the economic efficiency
argument); St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 66-69 (same criticism); Wilborn, Individual Employ-
ment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEa. L. REV.
101 (1988).
17. Advocacy of statutory change of the at-will rule is not original either. In fact,
numerous academics have also advocated this specific type of change. See, e.g., Summers,
Individual Protection, supra note 16, at 481; see also infra note 55.
18. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989).
[Vol. 42
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mon law, 19 precedent supports the view that those ancient provisions
should not prevent the continuing development of the common law. 20
It seems unlikely, however, that the California Supreme Court-as it
is presently constituted-will accept that argument any time soon.
Considerable flexibility remains within the common law joints.
The California Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.21
reaffirmed the proposition that the at-will presumption can be negated
by implied as well as express contractual provisions22 and left open
the question of remedies available for contractual breach.23 While the
court rejected tort damages for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, 24 it left intact the premise that the covenant inheres
in the employment contract as in other contracts.Y Thus freed from
the burden of carrying differential remedial consequences, the cove-
nant potentially can enjoy a broader interpretation in future cases. 26
Moreover, the public policy exception 27 to the at-will rule continues
to provide the plaintiff with tort remedies, despite the fact that the
exception itself is still largely undefined. 28 From the perspective of lit-
19. CAL. Cwy. CODE § 1999 (1872).
20. In Li v. Yellow Cab, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), the
California Supreme Court. abolished the defense of contributory negligence and replaced it
with a system of comparative negligence, even though the rule of contributory negligence was
then codified in California Civil Code section 1714. It held that section 1714 was not intended
to and did not preclude judicial action in furtherance of the purposes underlying it. Id. at
832, 532 P.2d at 1239, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871. The court based this holding in part on the
nature of the Code, which as a continuation of the common law, must remain flexible. Id. at
814-17, 532 P.2d at 1233-34, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66; cf. G. CALABRESI, A CoMOtr LAw
FOR Tm AGE OF STATuTEs (1982) (advocating the more radical position that courts should
disregard ancient statutes so as to require legislatures to confront them anew).
21. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
22. Id. at 676-82, 700, 765 P.2d at 384-88, 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 221-27, 239.
23. Id. at 699, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr, at 239. Justice Broussard, dissenting as
to the rejection of tort damages, suggested that contract damages could encompass recovery
for emotional distress in some cases. Id. at 712, 765 P.2d at 410, 254 Cal. Rptr: at 248
(Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One post-Foley case has held that
a plaintiff may recover, contract damages for emotional distress when the emotional distress
caused by the breach of an employment contract was foreseeable. Mosely v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., I DAILY LAB. REP. A-6, Jan. 2, 1990; cf. Carty, Contract Theory and Employment
Reality, 49 MOD. L. Rnv. 240 (1986) (discussing the issue of contract damages for emotional
distress caused by breach of an employment contract as handled under British law).
24. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
25. Id. at 683-84, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. 227.
26. See Tabb, Employee Innocence and the Privileges of Power: Reappraisal of Implied
Contract Rights, 52 Mo. L. REv. 803 (1987) (advocating an expanded role for the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing).
27. California courts, along with others, have held that an employee who is dismissed for
reasons that offend public policy has a cause of action in tort against his employer. Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (worker
dismissed for refusing to participate in unlawful activities).
28. The precise contours of the exception, however, have not been delineated. The court
November 1990] WRONGFUL TERMINATION
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igation attorneys on both sides, there is still plenty of fruit on the trees.
From the perspective of public policy, however, abandoning the
arena exclusively to common law development would be irresponsible
for a number of reasons. The field is full of uncertainties that will
take many years to resolve. Meanwhile, anomalies abound. Most of
the current wrongful termination plaintiffs are managerial or profes-
sional employees who have suffered a salary loss of sufficient mag-
nitude to make litigation worthwhile.2 9 Employers still are exposed to
substantial risks in these cases, depending upon variables not easily
predicted. 0 At the lower end of the wage scale, however, dismissed
workers who may have a good case are being turned away by attorneys
who cannot afford to handle the case absent potential for tort re-
covery." Finally, a majority of workers are effectively without any
protection at all: workers who are confronted with express at-will pro-
visions or the absence of tenable grounds for establishing contractual
limitations in their favor and who lack grounds for a public policy
claim.
in Foley held that the public policy exception did not apply to protect an employee from
dismissal for having reported to management that his supervisor was under investigation by
the FBI for embezzlement on another job. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 670, 765 P.2d at 380, 254
Cal. Rptr. at 218. At the same time, the Foley court reaffirmed the existence of the exception
and left open the question whether judicially declared policy sufficiently predicates its appli-
cation. Id. at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
Recently, two California district courts of appeal disagreed as to whether the state consti-
tutional right to privacy, which both courts agreed applied to private employers, adequately
predicated a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. Compare Luck v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1990) (inadequate for public policy
exception because privacy is a "private" matter) with Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087,
266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1990) (holding adequate for public policy exception because the public
has an interest in the assertion of privacy rights by individuals), reh'g denied, May 31, 1990
(LEXIS, States Library, Cal. file). Neither court, however, considered the possibility that the
state constitutional provision itself might give rise to tort remedies. See Friesen, Should
California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply Against Private Actors?, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111, 114-15 (1989).
29. A Rand Corporation analysis of 120 wrongful termination jury trials in California
between 1980 and 1986 showed that 53.4% of the plaintiffs were executive or middle man-
agement employees. THE RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE LEGAL AND EcoNoPMc
CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUl. TERMINATION (1988) [hereinafter THE RAND STUDY]. See also J.
DERTOUZOS, THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL: LEGAL AND ECONOMC COSTS 15 (1988).
30. See Jung & Harkness, Life after Foley: The Future of Wrongful Discharge Litigation,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 131 (1989) (an excellent analysis of the status of the law post-Foley); see,
e.g., Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 772 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding post-Foley
jury verdict for $137,000); Gardner v. Charles Schwab & Co., 216 Cal. App. 3d 1567, 1567,
267 Cal. Rptr. 326, 326 (1990) (upholding post-Foley jury verdict for $250,000 economic loss);
see also M. MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 2-5 (life after Foley from the employer perspective).
31. See Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931, 1940 (1983) (providing an early statistical demon-
stration of the bias of wrongful termination law against low income plaintiffs).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
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Moreover, even if courts could be relied on to provide additional
protection for workers, legislation would be the preferable solution. This
is not to suggest that courts should refrain from further progress in def-
erence to the legislature. To the contrary, there are excellent reasons for.
courts to push ahead on the common law front pefiding legislative ac-
tion. 32 But the surgery required to effectuate an optimum solution to
the wrongful termination problem lies outside the institutional, com-
petence of courts, or at least outside the normal common law expec-
tations of what is appropriate for the judicial branch. For example, as
Foley demonstrates, the categories of contract and tort and the remedies
customarily associated with those categories33 considerably constrain the
courts. The courts, therefore, have difficulty providing the most ap-
propriate alternative remedial schemes.3 And, in all likelihood, intel-
ligent minds could devise a better system for resolving termination disputes
than traditional litigation, with its attendant costs and delays.3 5 Only the
legislature can bring about those changes.
But if all this is true, why does the legislature remain silent? We
have become accustomed to legislative inertia, and we no longer mistake
it for evidence that problems requiring legislative attention do not exist.
Legislators react to demand, and in Sacramento the felt demand for
repeal of the at-will rule has not been great. Bills have been introduced,
but none has made it to the floor of the legislature. The principal bills
recently introduced include Senate Bill 282, introduced in 1989 by Sen-
ator Bill Greene and supported by the ACLU and the AFL-CIO, among
others,36 and Senate Bill 222, also introduced in 1989 by Senator Bev-
erly and supported by various groups of relatively enlightened
employers.3 7  An earlier bill, authored by Assemblyman
32. See Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L. Rav.
631 (1988) (arguing that there are ample grounds in existing doctrine to enable courts to do
away with the presumption of at-will employment).
33. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
34. For example, courts cannot legitimately fashion limitations on the duration of front
pay; nor can they award reinstatement as a remedy. See To Strike a New Balance: A Report
of the Adhoc Committee on Termination at Will and Wrongful Discharge, 13 LAB. &
EmPLoYMENT L. NEws 1, 5-6 (special ed. Feb. 8, 1984) [hereinafter Gould Proposal].
35. In spite of large awards in some cases and a high success rate, "the typical plaintiff
receives the equivalent of one-half year's severance pay." THE R-AND SrtmY, supra note 29,
at 27-28. On the whole, far more is spent in litigation than successful plaintiffs actually
recover. Id. at 25-26. Defense legal fees and expenses average about $80,000 per case (more
when large firms represent the defendant); 66% of plaintiffs' attorneys charge a contingency
fee of 40% or more of the final recovery. Id. In this study the average net payment to
successful plaintiffs was $188,520 (median $74,500) while the average combined legal fees of
both sides in these same cases amounted to $209,591. Id.
36. Cal. S. 282, 1988-1990 Reg. Sess. [hereinafter Greene Bill].
37. Cal. S. 222, 1988-1990 Reg. Sess. [hereinafter Beverly Bill].
November 1990] WRONGFUL TERMINATION
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McAlister, s in its original form contained the proposal that was drafted
with the leadership of Stanford Professor William B. Gould of the
State Bar Section on Labor and Employment Law. a9 The bills vary
considerably in their approach, and none has mustered widespread
support. Trial lawyers, typically a potent force in Sacramento, are
ambivalent about any statute, fearing it will deprive plaintiffs of the
last vestiges of tort recovery. Most employers and their attorneys are
seemingly content with the status quo after Foley and are not pressing
for change.
Still, legislation is in the wind. Workers comprise a significant
majority of the California population, 40 and of these only a'small frac-
tion are represented by unions. 41 It vould not take a great deal of
acumen or foresight for a politician to realize that political gold (as
well as justice) can be mined on this issue. Both Montana 42 and Puerto
Rico 43 have adopted wrongful termination statutes. Bills are under
consideration in other states, 44 and a committee of the Commission
38. Cal. A. 1400, 1984-1986 Reg. Sess., was introduced on March 5, 1985 by Assemblyman
Alister McAlister. An amended version of the bill was introduced on January 26, 1986 as Cal.
A. 2800, 1984-1986 Reg. Sess. Neither bill made it out of the Assembly Labor Committee.
The amended version of the bill is the one discussed in this Article [hereinafter McAlister
Bill].
39. See Gould Proposal, supra note 34. Generally, the proposal advocated a just cause
standard, administered through mandatory arbitration, and included reinstatement, loss of
pay, and fringe benefits for up to two years as potential remedies. Id. at 9-10 (summarizing
committee recommendations).
40. In 1987, wage and salary workers comprised 87.3% of the civilian labor force
(approximately 12 million wage and salary workers out of a civilian labor force of 13,747,000).
CALImORNiA DEPT. OF FINANCE, California Statistical Abstract 1988 Tables B-2, C-l, C-3, C-
16 (1989).
41. In 1987 approximately 18.7% of the wage or salary workers in California were union
members. Id. In actuality, the percentage of employees represented by unions is somewhat
higher since-in the absence of a contract requiring membership as a condition of employment-
not all union-represented employees are members of unions.
42. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-904 to -914 (1989). The Montana statute makes it wrongful
for an employer to discharge an employee who has completed his probationary period except
for "good cause," or to discharge any employee either in violation of the employer's own
personnel policy, or in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public policy, or for
reporting a violation of public policy. Id. § 39-2-904. Unless the parties agree to arbitrate, the
courts enforce the statute. Id. § 39-2-911(2). An employee found to have been wrongfully
terminated may recover lost wages and fringe benefits for a period not to exceed four years,
plus punitive damages if the employer is found by clear and convincing evidence to be guilty
of "actual fraud or actual malice." Id. § 39-2-905; see Tompkins, Legislating the Employment
Relationship: Montana's Wrongful Discharge Law, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 387 (1989).
43. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a-191 (1985 & Supp. 1988). The Puerto Rico statute
provides severance pay (one month's salary plus an additional week's pay for each completed
year of service) for employees found to have been terminated without just cause. Id. § 185a;
see Note, The Definition of Unjust Dismissal in Puerto Rico: Act No. 80 of May 30, 1976, 9
Coits. LAB. L.J. 320, 322 (1988) (authored by Teresa Chevres).
44. See e.g., N.J.S. 1291 (introduced Jan. 1, 1990 to Senate Committee on Labor and to
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on Uniform State Laws has been at work for nearly two years on draft
legislation. 45 The time is ripe for the California Legislature to act.
But what kind of legislation? The ideal may not be attainable,
but focusing on political obstacles accomplishes nothing. This Article
purports to identify the issues that need to be resolved and to evaluate
alternative ways of resolving them in a politically realistic manner.
There are seven principal issues that must be resolved by any statutory
proposal. The principal issues are:
(1) Statutory scope: what type of management decisions will the
statute affect?
(2) Statutory standard: what limitation should the statute place
on management decisions within the statutory scope?
(3) Employer coverage: which employers, if any, should be ex-
cluded from coverage?
(4) Employee coverage: which employees, if any, of otherwise
covered employers should be excluded from coverage?
(5) Enforcement mechanism: what agency or tribunal should en-
force the statute and what provisions for review should govern?
(6) Remedies; and
(7) Preemption: to what extent should the statutory enforcement
mechanism and remedies preempt other theories of recovery?
To some degree all seven issues interrelate because the optimum-
or politically achievable-solution to one issue depends on the others.
Moreover, the politically achievable obviously is subject to modifi-
cation as the political climate changes.
I. Statutory Scope
A wrongful termination statute's scope must cover at least dis-
charge from employment. Furthermore, to refrain employers from
evading the purpose of the statute, the statute should define "dis-
charge" (or the equivalent operative term) to include "constructive"
as well as actual discharges. 46 More debatable, however, is whether the
the Senate Committee on Labor, Industry, and Professions Jan. 22, 1990); N.Y.A. 1933, 212th
Sess. (introduced Jan. 24, 1989 to Assembly Committee on Labor, referred to Assembly
Committee on Code on May 16, 1989 and to the Assembly Ways and Means Committee on
June 6, 1989); see also N.Y.A. 904, 211th Sess. (1987) (previously proposed unjust dismissal
bill); N.Y.A. 8006, 211th Sess. (1987) (same); Mich. H.R. Res. 5892 (1982) (same); Pa. H.R.
Res. 1742 (1981) (same).
45. NATIONAL CoNF. OF CommiossiNoaRs ON UNIFoRM STATE LAWS, DRAFT UNIF. EMPLOY-
MENT TERMINATION AcT (July 13, 1990 draft proposal) [hereinafter DwR UIroRM AcT].
46. The Montana statute defines a constructive discharge as:
The voluntary termination of employment by an employee because of a situation
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statute should regulate in any way economic layoffs or forms of dis-
cipline that fall short of actual or constructive dismissal.
In American labor law a fairly clear traditional distinction exists
between discharge and layoff. A collective bargaining agreement typ-
ically restricts discharges through a "just cause" requirement, while
nothing comparable restricts layoffs.4 7 Occasionally an employer at-
tempts to conceal a discharge in the guise of a layoff, but the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB)4 and labor arbitrators 49 are alert to
that possibility and when it occurs they treat the action as a discharge
regardless of label. Presumably the decision maker under a wrongful
termination statute will do the same, though there would be nothing
lost if the statute contained language making that expectation clear.
Arguably, the law should provide a mechanism for reviewing an
employer's decision to institute an economic layoff in order to ensure
that sufficient justification exists. To do so, however, would go be-
yond current expectations under collective bargaining agreements (ex-
cept as to layoffs that carry anti-union motivation) and could inject
the decision maker into matters of business judgment. That seems a
rather ambitious goal for a wrongful termination statute at this time.
Instead, the law should provide a mechanism for reviewing the
employer's selection of employees for layoff and recall to ensure that
the employer makes the selection objectively and nonarbitrarily and
not as a subterfuge for dismissal. The accepted criterion with regard
to layoffs is seniority, at least among employees who are relatively
equally qualified to perform the jobs that remain. 0 One study showed
that workers expect and rely heavily upon the expectation that sen-
iority will control.5 Seniority is usually easy to compute, but whether
created by an act or omission of the employer which an objective, reasonable person
would find so intolerable that voluntary termination is the only reasonable alternative.
Constructive discharge does not mean voluntary termination because of an employer's
refusal to promote the employee or improve wages, responsibilities, or other terms
and conditions of employment.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(1) (1989).
47. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 7, 67 (12th ed. 1989)
[hereinafter BASIC PATTERNS].
48. See Purolator Armored, Inc. v. NLRB, 864 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985); NLRB v.
Campbell-Harris Elec. Co., 719 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1983); Hydro Logistics, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B.
602 (1987), aff'd, 897 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1990).
49. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 655.
50. Under "strict seniority" contracts, an employer may only consider seniority in the
event of layoffs. "Modified seniority" systems take into account fitness and ability to do the
job as well. Id. at 610-13. A minority of contracts treat seniority as a secondary factor, to be
considered only when ability and fitness are equal. BASIC PATTERNS, supra note 47, at 67.
51. P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 202-11 (1969). Selznick's study
found that attitudes towards seniority in the context of layoffs varied among different categories
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one employee is superior to another to such an extent as to justify a
junior selection is often deeply disputed in the union context. 52 Ap-
plying such criteria through a wrongful termination statute laudably
might check employer arbitrariness, but employers will resist it strongly.
As a compromise, the statute should allow a worker to claim that he
has been selected for layoff (or denied recall) arbitrarily, in bad faith,
or for reasons that offend public policy. 3
The question remains whether the statute should apply to dis-
ciplinary actions, for example demotion or suspension, other than dis-
missal. 4 Assuming a general statutory standard like "just cause," there
is a sound, principled argument that the standard should apply "across
the board," as it does under most collective bargaining agreements.
To do that, however, not only would provoke increaged employer op-
position; it also would require a substantially greater commitment of
public and private resources. With the exception of disciplinary action
motivated by considerations contrary to public policy, protection
against wrongful dismissal is a more realistic goal.
I. Standards
A consensus, reflected not only in the legal literature'- but in oth-
erwise variant statutory proposals 5 6 is growing that "just cause" (or
"good cause") is the most appropriate standard for a wrongful ter-
of employees: greater support for a seniority-based system existed among union employees
than among non-union employees and those with more education. Id.
52. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURi, supra note 5, at 617-42.
53. The statute proposed by Gould and the State Bar Committee provided that the statute
protect against arbitrary or bad faith selection. See Gould Proposal, supra note 34, at 13.
Notably, however, Gould himself voiced his reservations with respect to this committee position
and recommended instead that the proposed legislation cover all disciplinary actions. Id.
54. Most recent proposals do not extend to disciplinary action short of discharge, although
almost all would apply to constructive discharges. See, e.g., DRAFT UNrosm ACT, supra note
45, §1(7); Gould Proposal, supra note 34, at 13 (majority felt that extending coverage of
legislation to discipline short of discharge was premature). But see Greene Bill, supra note 36,
§ 2880(c) (the Bill's provisions would apply to suspensions for a period longer than three
months).
55. Bellace, supra note 11, at 238; St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 71; Stieber & Murray,
Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MiciH. J.L. REF.
319, 337 (1983).
56. See, e.g., Beverly Bill, supra note 37, § 2882(a)(1) ("just cause"); Gould Proposal,
supra note 34, at 11 ("just cause"); Greene Bill, supra note 36, § 2889(a) ("just cause"). The
Draft Uniform Act in section 2(a) provides for a "good cause" standard. DRAr UNruoaa
ACT, supra note 45, § 2(a). The Montana statute defines "good cause" as "reasonable job-
related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption
of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason." MONT. CODE ANN: § 39-2-
903(5) (1989).
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mination statute. The phrase has the combined virtues of a track rec-
ord as the accepted standard in labor arbitration and of flexibility.
Thus, a just cause standard is preferable to a catalogue of dismissals
deemed improper for particular reasons.17 Some proposals provide ex-
amples of acceptable grounds for dismissal, such as insubordination
and dishonesty, but since it is impossible to list all permissible grounds,
and since the propriety of dismissal on any ground will depend upon
the totality of circumstances, a listing has limited utility.
There are suggestions extant that the standard should differ for
different categories of employees; for example, the courts should give
greater deference to employers' decisions concerning managers or con-
fidential employees, on the theory that the appropriate considerations
are more subjective in such cases, and the employer needs greater lee-
way.5 9 The theory has merit, but I question the suggested solution. The
term "good cause" or "just cause" is itself sufficiently flexible to
allow consideration of such factors; what constitutes good cause for
firing any worker obviously must depend upon the worker's duties and
the criteria appropriate to evaluate his performance. Concern that the
decision maker may not give adequate weight to the appropriate cri-
teria in the case of managerial employees, for example, could be ad-
dressed by the addition of statutory language that draws attention to
the distinctive factors relevant to application of the good cause stan-
dard.6o
There also have been suggestions for differential standards of pro-
tection based on factors of longevity and earnings. The Beverly Bill,
for example, would reserve the broad just cause standard for em-
ployees who have worked for the employer for three years61 (two years
57. Contra Perritt, Wrongful Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L. REv. 65, 81-85 (1987)
(arguing in favor of the enumerated reasons approach).
58. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (definition of "good cause" specifically
includes list of specific acceptable reasons for dismissal); Greene Bill, supra note 36, § 2881(b)
(same type of specific listing).
59. I confess to authoring an opinion that suggests the decision maker should be more
deferential to the employer's judgment in the case of managerial or confidential employees.
In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981), the court
suggested that "It]he terms 'just cause' and 'good cause' . . . [are] 'largely relative in their
connotation, depending upon the particular circumstances of each case.' [W]here ... the
employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must of
necessity be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment." Id. at 330,
171 Cal. Rptr. at 927-28.
60. The Draft Uniform Act, in its comment on the definition of "good cause," addresses
this concern: "[c]onsideration will also be given to the character of the employee's responsi-
bilities, including the professional, scientific, or technical character of the work, the manage-
ment level of the employee's position in the enterprise, and its importance to the success of
the business." DRAFT UNi oRm ACT, supra note 45, at 8.
61. Beverly Bill, supra note 37, § 2882(b)(2).
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in the case of those earning less than $20,000).-62 Those earning more
than $100,000 would be totally excluded. 63 While the exclusion of high-
level personnel from a good cause requirement might be justified on
the ground that they are able to fend for themselves, there is room
for reasonable disagreement as to whether the exclusion should be
stated in terms of salary amount or in terms of job function. The
former is more precise, and thus less likely to lead to litigation; the
latter is tuned better to the purpose of the exclusion. In any event,
the exclusion probably should not extend to dismissals for reasons that
offend public policy. Moreover, differential standards based upon
length of service seem unnecessary. The decision maker can appro-
priately consider the longevity of the employee, subject to a proba-
tionary period, under the just cause standard.
None of the proposals addresses the question of the appropriate
dismissal procedure. This accords with the pattern that has developed
in labor arbitration cases: issues concerning the adequacy of notice
and opportunity for response are considered part of the just cause
question.64 Most European statutes, however, explicitly require pre-ter-
mination hearings before an employer dismisses an employee for mis-
conduct, so as to provide the employee with the opportunity to confront
and respond.6 Public employees who have job tenure in this country
similarly are entitled to informal pre-termination hearings as a matter
of constitutional due process." Consideration should be given to ex-
tending that protection to private employees under a just cause statute.
I. Employer Coverage
One question is whether the statute should apply only to the pri-
vate sector, or whether it should apply to governmental employers as
62. Id. § 2882(c)(2).
63. Id. § 2882(b)(3).
64. See KOVEN & SMr H, JUST CAUSE: TE SE EN TESTS (1985); Whirlpool Corp. v.
International Union of Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers Local 808, 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 421,
422 (1972) (Daugherty, Arb.).
65. See, e.g., SwEDmE's ACT ON SEcupary or EmoPoYmENT.oF 1982, as amended, §§ 30-
34 (Adlercreutz, Sweden, in 10 INTEmATONAL ENCYCLOPE A, supra note 9, tptp 329-33, at
121-22); Despax & Rojot, France, in 5 INTERATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 9, tptp 228-
35, at 115-18 (summary of French Act of 3 July 1986 modifying dismissal law and requiring
a hearing before notice of dismissal is given); Weiss, supra note 9, at 89; Note, Pretermination
Procedures Under Wrongful Termination Statutes, 14 HAsTiNGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. -
(forthcoming 1991) (authored by Karen Paull) (Federal Republic of Germany requires that the
works council be consulted before a dismissal is announced).
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The California Constitution requires
a pre-termination hearing before an employer dismisses a public employee with career status.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1974, amended 1979); Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194,
215, 539 P.2d 774, 788-89, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14, 28 (1975).
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well. Of course, many governmental employers have civil service sys-
tems that provide substantial job security, and there does not appear
to be need for additional protection through statute as to employees
covered by such systems. When employees are exempt from civil serv-
ice systems it is usually because a policy decision has been made that
the nature of their jobs requires their exemption. To draw the pro-
priety of that decision into the battle over a wrongful termination stat-
ute seems problematic. But there are governmental entities, such as
some of the special districts (irrigation districts, water districts, and
the like), that have no civil service system and a legitimate question
arises whether they should be covered. In principle, the answer is yes,
but that may be trying to do too much at once.
A second question is whether small employers, for example, those
employing fewer than a certain number of employees (five, ten, or
fifteen, according to the proposals) 67 should be exempt. The principal
justifications for such an exemption are two-fold: the relationship of
small employers to their employees is typically so personal that the
law ought not intervene, and the costs of making the statute applicable
to thousands of small employers would be too great. Combined with
the practical consideration that such an exemption would diminish
opposition to a proposed statute, I am inclined to go along with the
proposal, but again with an exception for public policy claims.
IV. Employee Coverage
One of the trickiest questions in this arena is whether the statute
should apply to employees who already are covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements. The federal labor preemption doctrine compli-
cates the answer to that question because there is some doubt regarding
the extent to which a state is permitted to provide systems of job pro-
tection and adjudication independent of the collective agreement and
its arbitration machinery. Recently, the United States Supreme Court
shed some light on the murky preemption question. In Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 68 the Court held that a state's appli-
67. The Draft Uniform Act proposes two alternatives: include all employers or only those
with five or more employees. DRAFr UNIFoRM ACT, supra note 45, § 12. The Greene Bill and
the Beverly Bill both would cover employers of five or more employees. Greene Bill, supra
note 36, § 2880(b); Beverly Bill, supra note 37, § 2881(d). The Gould Proposal would have
exempted employers of fewer than 15 employees, while the minority report would have drawn
the line at 50 employees. Gould Proposal, supra note 34, at 23, 43. Clyde Summers's 1976
proposal suggested including employers of 10 or more employees at the outset, with the
expectation of increasing coverage within a short time. Summers, Individual Protection, supra
note 16, at 526.
68. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
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cation of public policy protection to collective bargaining employees
(in that case, against dismissal for filing a workers' compensation claim)
did not offend federal labor policy.6 9 The Court held that the standard
for determining federal preemption was whether interpretation of the
collective agreement is required in order to resolve the state claim. 0
By that test, a statutory "just cause" standard should pass muster,
even though the collective agreement also protects against dismissal
without cause, because theoretically the criteria are distinct and in-
dependent of one another. One court has so held. 71
Assuming that a state could make its wrongful termination ma-
chinery available to collective bargaining employees, the question is
whether it should do so. Certainly the statute should avoid exposing
employers to cumulative procedures, at least when no public policy
violation is asserted. That could be done in one of two ways: either
by exempting employees covered by collective agreement except when
the agreement fails to provide for just cause limitation subject to ar-
bitration, or by requiring such employees to make a binding election
between state and private procedures. The first alternative would ex-
empt few current agreements, but some unions possibly would choose
to renegotiate their agreements to exclude arbitration of discharge
claims and to represent their members through the state machinery.
The second alternative parallels some civil service systems that allow
union-represented employees to opt between union-provided arbitra-
tion and civil service adjudication. 72 Such an option potentially de-
prives employers of the insulation provided by union screening of
grievances, but employers confront that problem with unorganized
workers as well. The statute might address that issue by providing for
screening of claims for probable .cause, or it might seek to deter friv-
olous claims through the requirement of filing fees. In any event, op-
timum resolution of the collective bargaining coverage issue requires
that both management and labor participate in some creative nego-
tiation.
Less controversial is the exclusion of probationary employees, for
example, employees during a probationary period established by the
69. Id. at 408-10.
70. Id. at 413.
71. Santoni Roig v. Iberia Lineas Adreas de Espafia, 688 F. Supp. 810 (D.P.R. 1988);
see also Challenger Caribbean Corp. v. Union Gen. de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 903 F.2d
857, 867-68 (1st Cir. 1990) (Puerto Rico's "Rule 80" simply establishes a "minimum employ-
ment standard" and need not be interpreted to conflict with the Labor Management Relations
Act).
72., In Oakland, California, for example, the memorandum of understanding between the
City and the Police Officers Association contains a provision allowing such a choice. Conver-
sation with Duane B. Reno, attorney.
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employer, not to exceed some statutory maximum-perhaps six months
as a standard period, with a longer period permitted when required
for adequate evaluation.73 It is generally accepted in our industrial
system that an employer has the right to give an employment applicant
a chance at the job without having to explain the reasons for ter-
mination if the trial period does not work out. An exception should
probably be made, however, for those cases in which an employer
terminates a probationary employee for reasons that offend public
policy.
Those employees who have express written contracts for a spec-
ified term constitute a special category. They have no need for the
substantive protection of the statute (again, perhaps subject to public
policy claims), but they may find the statutory procedure useful for
the enforcement of their contracts as an alternative to litigation.7 4
V. Enforcement Mechanism
There are three general categories of enforcement systems: court,
administrative agency, and arbitration. Of the three, the court system
is the least attractive. For the employee, trials require time and money,
acceptable only if the potential for payoff is very large-an unlikely
result of any statute. For the employer, there is the additional dis-
advantage that juries are perceived to be more easily swayed by emo-
tional appeal and, in any event, less likely to be sympathetic to the
employer's arguments than either of the other two alternative systems.
Further, public policy does not support any addition to the congestion
of courts.
Allocating enforcement of the statute to an administrative agency
would be the easiest alternative, particularly if the agency were one
73. The Gould Proposal, the Draft Uniform Act, and the Greene Bill all propose a six-
month probationary period for all employees. See DRAFr UNIFORm ACT, supra note 45, at §
1(1); Gould Proposal, supra note 34, at 22; Greene Bill, supra note 36, § 2880 (a)(1). The
Beverly Bill would exclude employees who had worked for the employer for less than three
years (two years for those earning less than $20,000 per year), though these exclusions would
not apply to terminations that violated public policy. Beverly Bill, supra note 37, § 2882.
Summers has suggested that flexible application of the just cause standard "could give weight
to the employer's practical need and ability to judge the suitability of the employee for the
particular job involved." Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 16, at 525.
74. The Gould Proposal would exempt individuals covered by a written contract of a
year's duration and a minimum of four months' notice provision. Gould Proposal, supra note
34, at 23. The Draft Uniform Act would allow written agreements waiving the good cause
protection if the contract provides for severance pay (a minimum of one month's pay for each
year of service for the first five years, with amounts increasing with longer service). DRAFr
UNIFoRM ACT, supra note 45, § 4(b).
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already in existence-the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 75
for example, or the Fair Employment and Housing Commission. Such
agencies have an infrastructure in place; they have some institutional
experience in handling cognate matters; and they have procedures for
hearing, determination, and appeal that are known to the legal pro-
fession. Funding would be a matter of adding to an existing agency
budget, presumably a politically easier course than the creation of a
new enforcement entity.
There are, however, drawbacks to the agency alternative. One is
the potential for delay. The traditional agency model-investigation,
mediation, administrative hearing, internal agency review, followed by
the prospect of judicial review-is hot suited to speedy final deter-
mination even under the best of conditions. When the agency is un-
derstaffed as well, as has been the case with many California agencies
in recent years, the problem is exacerbated. Attorneys who have rep-
resented employees before such agencies often have become frustrated
with delays, and employer attorneys have been heard to complain that
the agency staffs are lacking in professionalism and impartiality. For
these reasons, presumably, enthusiasm for the agency alternative has
not been great within the relevant constituencies.
Numerous academicians advocate arbitration as the optimum al-
ternative solution.7 6 Almost all the statutory proposals made to date
integrate arbitration in one form or another. The reasons are fairly
obvious. Arbitration holds the potential for low-cost, relatively speedy
determinations by individuals having a certain relevant expertise and
understanding and requires minimum judicial review. 77 Its wide ac-
ceptance and long history within the context of collective bargaining,
and most attorneys' familiarity with it, make it a natural choice. 78
Transplanting the institution of arbitration from the collective
bargaining arena and harnessing it to the enforcement of a wrongful
termination statute poses some difficulties that need to be con-
fronted.79 Collective bargaining arbitration is the product of agreement
between the parties. The arbitrator's task is primarily to interpret and
apply that contractual agreement within the framework of the parties'
own relationship.80 The parties themselves select and pay the arbitra-
75. See Bellace, supra note 11, at 207 (advocating use of the unemployment machinery).
76. See, e.g., Gould Proposal, supra note 34, at 405; St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 77-
78; Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 16, at 521.
77. F. ELKo RI & E. Eucousu, supra note 5, at 7-9.
78. Id. at 2-3.
79. See Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YAIX L.J. 916 (1979) (an
early warning against simple transplantation of the collective bargaining model).
80. Of course, the parties can authorize an arbitrator to resolve statutory questions as
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tor, and the union screens the cases that go to arbitration. Arbitration
under a wrongful termination statute, however, is likely to be a dif-
ferent sort of animal.
One difference is the manner in which arbitrators are selected.
Most proposals assume that those who serve as arbitrators will have
labor arbitration experience, and that the parties will select the ar-
bitrator (as under many labor agreements) from lists of suitable per-
sons maintained by some public agency. 8' That process may take on
a different color, however, when an employer and an individual em-
ployee (rather than his union) selects the arbitrator. Since any given
employer is likely to be involved in the selection process more fre-
quently than any given employee, there may develop an information
gap in which employers, with greater knowledge of the propensities
of particular arbitrators, have an unfair advantage in that process.
Moreover, arbitrators may, consciously or otherwise, slant their op-
inions to favor employers, knowing that they play a more substantial
role in the selection process. Both risks could be minimized, however,
if an organization (such as the Employment Law Center of San Fran-
cisco, a union, or the Central Labor Council) acted as a source of
information, and perhaps assistance, in the selection of arbitrators.
Furthermore, a source of published arbitration decisions would also
help to minimize the risks, by enabling parties to assess an arbitrator's
ability and inclinations. Alternatively, a public agency, such as the
State Conciliation Service, 82 could appoint the arbitrator; but expe-
rience with arbitration generally teaches us that the process and its
results are more likely to be accepted by the parties if both of the
parties participate in the selection.
Some proposals for arbitration under a wrongful termination stat-
ute would make the process mandatory.8 3 In several significant re-
spects, that would be preferable: it would remove any advantage either
party might have, or might think it has, over the other through the
exercise of a veto; it would avoid the public costs of litigation; and
it would more readily justify the expenditure of public funds to finance
the process. These advantages, however, must be balanced against two
disadvantages. One is political: at present, a substantial segment of
well as questions of contract interpretation. See, e.g., Challenger Caribbean Corp. v. Union
Gen. de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 903 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1990).
81. See, e.g., DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note 45, § 5; Gould Proposal, supra note 34,
at 12; Greene Bill, supra note 36, § 2888(b).
82. The State Conciliation Service is an agency that is authorized to mediate labor disputes.
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1137.1(d) (West 1989).
83. DRAFr UNIFORM ACT, supra note 45, § 5; Gould Proposal, supra note 34, at 8-11;
Greene Bill, supra note 36, § 2888(b).
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the employer community opposes the idea of mandatory arbitration.
The other is legal: mandatory arbitration possibly would violate the
provisions of the California Constitution that allocate judicial power
to the courts and guarantee the right to trial by jury.84
Most state constitutions contain similar allocation provisions,85 as
does the federal Constitution, 86 but interpretation of these provisions
varies.8 7 In McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board 8 the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held that the allocation of authority to an ad-
ministrative agency to make restitutive money awards is permissible
under the "judicial powers" clause of the California Constitution only
if two tests are met. The first is a "substantive" test: the remedial
authority must be "reasonably necessary to effectuate the adminis-
trative agency's primary, legitimate regulatory piurposes.' '89 The sec-
ond is the "principle of check": the "essential" judicial power must
"remain ultimately in the courts through review of agency determi-
nations."' 9 If those two conditions are met, the state constitutional
requirement for jury trial will be deemed satisfied as well. 91 Applying
these criteria, the McHugh court upheld (against attack under both
the "judicial powers" and "jury trial" clauses) a grant of authority
to a local rent control board to hear and determine tenants' claims
that they were charged rents in excess of the maximum established by
the board pursuant to the local charter. Though "judicial in nature, ' 9 2
such actions were both authorized by the charter and reasonably nec-
essary to the agency's primary and legitimate purpose of setting and
regulating maximum rents in the local housing market; hence, the sub-
stantive test was met. 93 The charter also provided for judicial review
84. Article VI, section I of the California Constitution vests judicial power in the courts.
The Constitution grants the Legislature the power to confer judicial power to certain agencies
for specified purposes. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (guarantees the right to trial by
jury); CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5 (Public Utilities Commission); CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § I
(labor relations); CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 (workers' compensation).
85. See Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional
Issues, 68 OR. L. Rv. 487 (1989).
86. U.S. CONST. art. III (judicial power); id. amend VII.
87. See Golann, supra note 85; cf. H. PEmuRR, CONsTr=tONAL, PoLrcAL, AND ATTI-
TUDINAL BAMuRERS TO REFORMING WRONGFUL DishussAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK
UNivRsiTY FoRTY-SEcoND ANNuAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR § 3.05[2] (B. Stein ed.
1989).
88. 49 Cal. 3d 348, 777 P.2d 91, 261 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1989), reh'g denied, Nov. 1, 1989
(LEXIS, States Library, Cal. file).
89. Id. at 372, 777 P.2d at 106, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 380, 777 P.2d at 112, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
92. Id. at 375, 777 P.2d at 108, 261 Cal. Rpfr. at 336.
93. Id.
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of the board's decision through petition for administrative mandate.
Two other provisions of the charter did not fare so well. A grant of
power to the board to award treble damages in addition to "resti-
tutive" excess rent amounts was found to violate the judicial powers
clause, primarily on the ground that such power "in the present con-
text poses a risk of producing arbitrary, disproportionate results that
magnify, beyond acceptable risks, the possibility of arbitrariness in-
herent in any scheme of administrative adjudication. ' 94 Furthermore,
a provision that purported to authorize a tenant to withhold rental
amounts that the board determined to be overpayments was held to
violate the "principle of check" because it gave legal effect to the
board's order prior to judicial review. 95
For purposes of deciding whether McHugh applies to a particular
grant of authority, there appears to be no substantive distinction be-
tween an entity called an "administrative agency" and an entity called
an "arbitrator." Consequently, we must assume that a statute that
mandates arbitration of wrongful termination claims would have to
meet the McHugh criteria. Presumably a statute that simply authorized
an arbitrator to determine whether a discharge met statutory standards
and to order reinstatement and lost pay if not, would have no trouble
meeting the "reasonable necessity/legitimate regulatory purpose" re-
quirement. Furthermore, the McHugh court, in striking down the pro-
vision for treble damages, was careful to note that it was not passing
upon the constitutional propriety of administrative imposition of pen-
alties in general. 96 Indeed, the court cited with no apparent disagree-
ment both state and federal authorities that approved such authority
in principle. 97 The court even qualified its negative comments about
the authority to award treble damages by positing its comments in "the
present context." 98 Thus, McHugh apparently leaves ample room for
a variety of remedies under a wrongful termination statute.
The "principle of check" enunciated in McHugh poses a poten-
tially more difficult obstacle depending upon what kind of judicial
review that principle requires. The court did not purport to lay down
a general rule. Rather, it acknowledged that the procedures and scope
of review "necessary to fulfill the goal of reserving to the courts this
essential attribute of judicial power" might vary from one category
of case to another, and it did not undertake to decide those questions
94. Id. at 379, 777 P.2d at 111, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
95. Id. at 376-77, 777 P.2d at 109-10, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
96. Id. at 378, 777 P.2d at 110, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
97. Id. at 378 n.45, 777 P.2d at 110 n.45, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 338 n.45.
98. Id. at 379, 777 P.2d at 111, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
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beyond the case at hand. 99 Considerable flexibility is required, how-
ever, in order to embrace within the "principle of check" the truncated
review commonly associated with arbitration awards. °° In McHugh
the court assumed that because a private party had a "direct pecuniary
interest" in the agency's determination, a court would be called upon
in an administrative mandamus proceeding (as a matter of .California
law) to exercise its "independent judgment" on the record, rather than
to determine merely whether substantial evidence supported the agen-
cy's findings.'0' Either level of review, of course, would be wholly at
odds with the general principle accepted in both labor and commercial
arbitration that a court must not concern itself with the merits of the
award, but should confine its scrutiny to assuring minimal propriety
in the process. 02
If arbitration is to be mandatory, a strong policy argument also
supports some judicial review for errors of law. A labor arbitrator's
award is final as long as it draws its "essence" from the agreement
of the parties. 0 3 An arbitrator -is likely to get into trouble with the
courts only to the extent he invokes "external" law as the basis for
his decision.' °4 The courts do not worry about inconsistencies among
arbitral decisions because no principle requires one agreement to be
interpreted like another and because the agreement can always be
changed through negotiation. But any decision of an arbitrator under
a statutory "just cause" provision would be based upon "external
99. Id. at 373, 777 P.2d at 107, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35.
100. Under federal labor law, the arbitrator must interpret the agreement, and the arbitra-
tor's decision will be upheld as long as it draws its essence from the agreement. United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Generally,
the scope of review is limited to verifying procedural fairness and the impartiality of the
arbitrator. An arbitrator's decision will be overturned only if the award does not draw its
essence from the agreement; if the arbitrator exceeded his authority; for prejudicial exclusion
of evidence; for bias or corruption; and for similar reasons. F. ELKoURI & E. ELIoURI, supra
note 5, at 28-31.
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that a court may vacate an arbitrator's award when
an award is tainted by corruption, fraud, or undue influence, in cases of prejudicial misconduct
by the arbitrator, and when arbitrators exceed their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988). The scope
of review under California law is substantially the same. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE, § 1286.2
(West 1982).
101. McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 375 n.36, 777 P.2d at 108 n.36, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 336 n.36.
102. See generally Steelworkers, 363 U.S. 593 (labor arbitration); M. DoMKE, DomKE ON
COM MCIAL ARBITRATION (Supp. 1989) (commercial arbitration).
103. See supra note 100.
104. Under federal labor law principles, the Supreme Court has declared that the arbitral
decision, to warrant enforcement, must "dra[w] its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement," Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 597, and that it is the arbitrator's task "to effectuate
the intent of the parties" rather than the requirements of enacted legislation. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974).
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law" by definition in the sense that the decision exists outside the
agreement. While the arbitrator might be well advised or even sta-
tutorily ordered to rely on the decisions of labor arbitrators for guid-
ance, he is, after all, applying a public statute and a public norm, and
inconsistencies in the application of public norms offend our tradi-
tional notions of equal protection and the rule of law. Most discharge
cases are highly fact specific, but inevitably some will require applying
general standards of "just cause," the scope of public policy contained
in other statutes, or constitutional provisions. To establish a system
in which inconsistencies may develop without providing a means for
reconciling them is problematic.'05
To open the door to judicial review on any ground, however,
threatens to deprive arbitration of one of its most valuable attributes:
fast and inexpensive dispute resolution. If there is to be limited review
for errors of law, some creative thinking should be directed toward
compensating for and deterring delay, perhaps through a system of
liquidated damages recoverable when judicial review fails to produce
vacation or modification of an award.
Current California law provides two models of what might be
called "quasi-mandatory arbitration." Under the Uninsured Motor-
ists' Statute, policies containing uninsured motorists coverage must
contain a provision for arbitration of claims."° As far as it appears
from the reported cases, that statute never has been challenged on jury
trial or judicial powers grounds. A corollary model under a wrongful
termination statute would mandate the adoption of an employment
contract containing a provision for arbitration of termination disputes
in accordance with statutory standards. I doubt, however, that the
California Supreme Court could be persuaded to exempt that ar-
rangement from the McHugh requirements. 0 7
The other current model, the judicial arbitration statute, requires
that the parties submit disputes under a stipulated amount to arbi-
tration but allows either party to seek a trial de novo, subject to sanc-
tions if the party fails in litigation to improve the results he obtained
in arbitration. 08 No doubt that model would satisfy McHugh, but at
105. Such a system apparently exists in Canada. Under an amendment to the Canada
Labor Code, "adjudicators" hear claims of wrongful dismissal and the adjudicator's order
"is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court." Act of April 20, 1978, ch.
27, 1977-1978 Can. Stat. 617, § 61.5(10). The question posed by the text seems not to have
been raised. See Simmons, Unjust Dismissal of the Unorganized Workers in Canada, 20 STAN.
J. INT. L. 4739 (examining practice under the statute).
106. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(f) (West Supp. 1990).
107. See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
108. CA. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1141.10-1141.30 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
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the same time, it would present the unattractive potential for dual
litigation.
The McHugh problem could be avoided, and the policy concerns
over the absence of judicial review minimized, if arbitration were vol-
untary rather than mandatory. There would then be the risk, of course,
that the values of arbitration would be sacrificed to the self interest
of the party who, for one reason or another, finds it advantageous
to opt for litigation. An employer-and it appears to be employers
who presently oppose mandatory arbitration-may be motivated to
submit a legal defense to a judge rather than an arbitrator. Plaintiffs,
conversely, most likely prefer a jury in cases in which the damage
potential is relatively high.
Some proposals for voluntary arbitration seek to minimize that
risk by providing both parties with incentive to accept an offer to ar-
bitrate. The Montana statute provides that a party who makes a valid
offer to arbitrate that is not accepted by the other party and who pre-
vails in litigation is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees from the date
of the offer. 109 The Beverly Bill also would have awarded attorney's
fees to a prevailing employee whose arbitration offer is rejected by
an employer; 10 but as to employer offers, the Bill provided that the
employee who rejects the offer forfeits back and front pay from the
date of the offer, even if he otherwise succeeds in litigation."' The
Montana solution is unrealistic in its expectation that an employee will
be able to pay the employer's attorney's fees, and the Beverly solution
inequitably impacts employees. If, as I suggest, a successful employee
ought to be allowed reasonable attorney's fees in arbitration, disal-
lowance of such fees in litigation (except when the employee has of-
fered to arbitrate and the employer refuses) may in itself effectively
motivate the employee to bypass litigation. Additional incentive may
be helpful. And, on the employer side, some amount of liquidated
damages can be added to attorney's fees as a deterrent.
Whether the statute mandates or allows arbitration, it must ad-
dress how the arbitrator is paid. In most arbitrations, including labor
arbitrations, the parties equally share the arbitrator's fee. Some of the
legislative proposals retain that formula," 2 but it seems singularly in-
appropriate to the enforcement of rights under a public statute. Tra-
ditionally public forums are publicly financed; we do not ask litigants
(even wealthy corporations) to pay for the time of the judge who hears
109. MoNT. CODE AN. § 39-2-914(4) (1989).
110. Beverly Bill, supra note 37, § 2887(b)(1).
111. Id. § 2887(c)(I).
112. See, e.g., Gould Proposal, supra note 34, at 17.
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the case. To tell workers that for the first time they may enjoy legal
protection against wrongful dismissal only if they have the money to
pay for it would be anomalous and unfair. Certainly that would be
true if arbitration was mandatory and thus constituted the only means
of enforcing the statute. But even if we make arbitration voluntary,
as long as we seek at the same time to induce its use, charging em-
ployees anything more than a nominal filing fee seems counterpro-
ductive. Either the public should fund arbitration directly, fostering
the purposes of the statute and avoiding further clogging of the courts,
or arbitration should be funded through an assessment on employers,
perhaps through a tax on payroll.
Whatever the remedial scheme, it is desirable to provide prelim-
inary mediation through the State Conciliation Service." 3 Further-
more, if an employer offers reasonable grievance procedures, employees
should be required to exhaust them up to some statutory maximum
period. 1 4
VI. Remedies
Reinstatement with back pay is the traditional labor-employment
law remedy for wrongful discharge under most of the federal and state
statutes that prohibit dismissal for particular reasons and under labor
arbitration."5 Back pay, in this context, includes loss of monetary ben-
efits, such as medical benefits or retirement benefits, attributable to
the dismissal." 6 Persuasive arguments, however, support modifying
that pattern under a wrongful termination statute.
A reinstatement order, which has been shown to have question-
able long-range value to the employee under existing schemes," 7 is
likely to be even less valuable under a scheme in which there is no
labor organization to provide continuing protection against retalia-
113. The Greene and Beverly Bills provide for mandatory mediation before arbitration.
Beverly Bill, supra note 37, § 2888(a)(1); Greene Bill, supra note 36, § 2887(a). Neither the
Draft Uniform Act, nor the Montana statute has such provisions.
114. The Montana statute requires employees to exhaust internal procedures; state or
federal law provides another remedy, as in the case of employment discrimination statutes.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(2) (1989). The Draft Uniform Act allows an extension of the
time for filing of up to 60 days if the employee pursues internal grievance procedures, but
does not require the employee to exhaust such procedures. DRAFT UNIFORM ACT, supra note
45, § 7b(3).
115. 2 LABOR & EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 42.03, at 42-17 to 42-19 (T. Bornstein & A.
Gosline, eds. 1990); EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 521-23, 1418-19. (B.L. Schlei & P.
Grossman eds. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
116. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 688-90.
117. Aspin, Legal Remedies Under the NLRA, Remedies Under 8(a)(3), 23 INDUS. REL.
RES. A. 264 (1970); Chaney, The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited, 32 LAB. L.J. 357, 365
(1981).
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tion.118 An employee should have this protection available as an al-
ternative, perhaps with a back-up provision for additional penalties
if the employer dismisses the employee a second time without cause.
The decision maker also should have discretion to consider other al-
ternatives.
The most likely alternative is front pay: an award of money rep-
resenting a prediction of what the employee will lose in the post-judg-
ment future as a result of the wrongful dismissal, taking into
consideration earning potential in other jobs." 9 Some of the proposals
that provide for front pay would limit compensation to one or two
years,' 2° apparently on the theory that prediction beyond such a period
is highly conjectural, and that most employees can find comparable
employment within such a period. In other contexts, however, such
as workers' compensation, disability retirement, and the tort system
generally-in which wage loss is projected on a lifetime basis-we do
not seem overly concerned about the difficulties of computation.
Moreover, even though in those cases the employee usually has some
disability that hinders future employment, comparable situations may
exist in wrongful termination cases as well. The dismissed employee,
for example, may be in an undesirable age bracket, in a narrow labor
market, or subject to potential discrimination because of his dismissal
and the litigation over it, so as to make reemployment within one or
two years unlikely. I am inclined to think that the decision maker should
have authority to award front pay for longer periods upon a proper
showing that such factors are present. Alternatively, older workers
could receive front pay without deduction for mitigation, as the Gould
draft proposed.'2 '
Another area that departs from the traditional model involves the
costs of representation. The traditional model was established in a
context in which the worker could have free representation by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board or by a union. When such representation
is not available, as in the case of Title VII litigation, for example, the
statute typically provides for an award of attorney's fees to the pre-
vailing employee.' Unless the wrongful termination statute provides
118. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv.
1, 41-42.
119. 2 A. LAxsoN, EmpLOYMENT DiscRMmAToN §55.39 at 11-80.59 to 11-80.61 (1988).
120. The Greene Bill limits front pay to two years from the time reinstatement is determined
inappropriate. Greene Bill, supra note 36, § 2884(c)(2). The Beverly Bill does not specify a
limit to front pay but would cut it off entirely if an employee refuses a reasonable offer of
reinstatement. Beverly Bill, supra note 37, § 2887(c)(2). West proposes an award of two
months' pay for each year of service with the employer, in addition to any back pay due, in
lieu of reinstatement and tort damages. West, supra note 118, at 56-57.
121. Gould Proposal, supra note 34, at 14.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988) ("[u]pon application by the complainant and in
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remedies of such magnitude as to make contingent fee arrangements
realistic, it would seem essential for the statute's efficacy that it pro-
vide for effective representation in some such fashion. To avoid ex-
tensive litigation over fees, a base formula for fee recovery can be
included, as in the English system.12 1
Finally, there is the question whether the statute should provide
for monetary compensation beyond back (or front) pay and the rea-
sonable costs of representation, either by way of compensation or by
way of deterrence. Undoubtedly, a worker who is terminated from
employment suffers damages that are not adequately compensated by
reimbursement of employment-connected wages and benefits. There
may be ancillary economic damages (such as the loss of a house for
failure to make mortgage payments) as well as emotional trauma. Such
damages, however, also are not compensable under the traditional la-
bor law model. The justification commonly asserted for that shortfall
is that such damages would overburden a system designed to provide
efficient remedy at low cost. One may question that justification, but
whether a stand for a new remedial structure should be made in a
wrongful termination statute is another (and primarily political) ques-
tion.
There is, I think, substantial justification for considering awards
of additional amounts for the purpose of deterring particularly egre-
gious conduct by employers, such as dismissal for a reason that of-
fends public policy or dismissal undertaken by an employer who
knowingly lacks good cause. Precedent supports the proposition in
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act'2 that allows the award
of punitive damages in judicial proceedings. 25 The Montana statute
provides for punitive damages in cases of "actual fraud or actual
malice." 26
VII. Preemption and Preclusion
We come now to the most difficult part of this puzzle: to what
extent should the procedures and remedies provided by the statute be
such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such
complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees,
costs, or security" (emphasis added)). See also 29 U.S.C § 2005(c) (1988) (employee or
prospective employee may bring private action under Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
1988).
123. See Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 37, 58 (1984).
124. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12987(2) (West Supp. 1989).
125. Commodore Home Sys. Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 215, 185 Cal. Rptr.
270, 272 (1982).
126. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(2) (1989).
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exclusive, and to what extent should plaintiffs be permitted to pursue
remedies under other state statutes and currently available common
law theories. This part is difficult not because it is particularly com-
plicated, but because it is highly charged. Employees and their lawyers
presumably would prefer a world in which everything is cumulative
and not exclusive, so that they would be free to pursue their rights
under the statute in addition to and independent of any other rights
that they presently have. Plaintiffs' trial lawyers, who collectively con-
stitute a formidable political force, will likely resist any attempt to do
away with a presently lucrative potential for litigation. Employers, in
principle, would obviously prefer that the statute preempt everything.
To the extent that employers' cooperation may be necessary in order
to get the statute passed, they are hardly likely to cooperate in es-
tablishing a scheme that preempts nothing. I will not attempt to answer
whether a statute could be passed over the opposition of either trial
lawyer or employer lobbies. What I will attempt is to explore what
kind of compromise might be fair.
Clearly, the availability of remedies under a wrongful termination
statute should not preclude an employee from pursuing remedies for
race, sex, or other forms of discrimination available under the Cal-
ifornia Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).' 27 The more dif-
ficult question arises with overlapping claims, when the employee says
she believes she was discharged because she is female, but asserts that
in any event her dismissal was without just cause. If the statute were
to provide for enforcement through normal court procedure, the prob-
lem could be resolved easily: the employee could assert separate causes
of action under both statutes that would be resolved by the same tri-
bunal. If the wrongful termination statute were administered through
arbitration, however, or through an administrative agency, some rule
of priority would have to be established. The discrimination claim
would not be heard by the wrongful termination tribunal, or it would
be heard by the wrongful termination panel and its decision would be
binding on the discrimination claim, or it would be heard by the
wrongful termination tribunal without prejudice to the right of the
employee to pursue remedies under the FEHA if she is not satisfied
with the result.
The first alternative would require the employee to pursue and
the employer to defend related theories before different tribunals. That
hardly seems sensible. The second alternative would protect employers
against repetitive claims, but that protection would not extend to Title
127. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12995 (Deering Supp. 1990).
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VII claims, and it would take away the employee's presently held op-
portunity for punitive damages under the state statute. The third al-
ternative follows the present model for the relationship between labor
arbitration and Title VII, 128 but employers are unlikely to perceive it
as fair. Perhaps the better course would be to follow the model that
exists under the California Code of Civil Procedure, 129 and stay ar-
bitration of the wrongful termination claim pending adjudication of
the discrimination claim, or vice versa. Of course, the statute could
not limit the assertion of rights under federal statutes.
As to common law theories, consider the models at the two ex-
tremes: the statute preempts nothing, or it preempts everything. The
difference between the two models would have its impact primarily
upon those employees who would find it worthwhile to maintain lit-
igation now, despite Foley, since employees who would not find lit-
igation worthwhile presumably would utilize the statute regardless of
the preemption rules. Under the first model, employees in that liti-
gation-prone category would acquire an option they presently do not
have; under the second model, they would be forced to give up their
litigation option. Under the first model, employers collectively would
have considerably greater exposure to monetary liability; under the
second model, their current exposure to liability in litigation would
be offset by exposure under the statute. It would be useful to know
what the total cost difference might be; I do not believe we have suf-
ficient data to compute that difference at present.
It might make sense, in terms of both good government and prac-
tical politics, to consider a middle ground. Since the statute would
protect covered employees against and (under my suggestion) provide
them with additional compensation for terminations in violation of
public policy, the statute can be made the exclusive remedy for wrong-
ful termination per se. On the other hand, a compelling justification
does not appear to exist for using the statute to cut off independent
tort claims that an employee might otherwise maintain, and could have
maintained even if common law wrongful termination principles had
never developed as they did, as a means of remedying injuries that
the statute would not address. This would include a claim for defa-
mation or invasion of privacy independent of the termination itself.
In all likelihood, the California Supreme Court will soon answer
128. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974), held that the remedies
available under grievance arbitration and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are cumulative. The
employee in that case had separable rights under both the collective bargaining agreement and
Title VII that could be enforced separately. Id.
129. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.4 (West 1982).
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whether a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can
survive the preemptive effect of the Workers Compensation Act.
Conclusion
As with any legal reform that cuts across existing interests and
expectations, the drafting and passage of a wrongful termination stat-
ute will not be easy. This process requires creativity, compromise, and
leadership on the part of the drafters. It is every bit as important,
however, as were the reforms in anti-discrimination law, consumer
law, and environmental law of the past decades. And, it is every bit
as inevitable.
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